Abstract-A number of different multimedia fingerprinting algorithms and identification techniques were proposed and analyzed recently. This paper presents a content identification setup for a class of multimedia data that can be modeled by the Gauss-Markov process. We advocate a constrained order statistics decoding scheme based on digital fingerprints extracted from correlated data to identify contents. Finally, we investigate the fundamental limits of the proposed setup by deriving bounds on the miss and false acceptance probabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today's world, digital reproduction tools and user generated content (UGC) websites such as Youtube, Flicker, etc., have performed an impressive evolution, providing professional solutions to various groups of users. Besides these obvious advantages, at the same time these tools have raised concerns about copyrighted content protection. Thus, content based identification (CBI) becomes a critical issue.
Multimedia applications use high-dimensional data that are frequently privacy-sensitive. The data are also highly correlated in spatial and time coordinates. Moreover, multimedia data might be severely distorted due to the habitual chain of processing, transcoding, communication and storage. Therefore, in order to design a robust CBI system, one must consider not only its ability to handle high-dimensional, correlated and privacy-sensitive data but also its performance under strong distortions.
There exist several approaches to deal with the former problems, such as robust hashing or digital fingerprinting. A digital fingerprint represents a short, robust and distinctive content description. The main idea behind digital fingerprinting approaches is to extract digital fingerprints of a lower dimensionality with a maximum possible entropy, e.g., in the binary case the bits of digital fingerprints should be independently and equally likely 0s and 1s. However, since multimedia data are correlated, one of the principle tasks of a dimensionality reduction transform is to eliminate correlation between the samples. A mapper that possesses such properties is the Karhunen-Loève transform (KLT) [1] . However, the price that must be paid for this optimality is its high computational complexity. In order to relax this issue, several approximations of the KLT were proposed such as the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) [1] . The basis vectors of these transforms are fixed and independent of the statistics of their inputs. However, the main drawback of the fixed basis transforms consists in the public disclosure of the basis vectors, which is rarely acceptable for multimedia security applications [2] .
One solution to overcome this privacy/security shortcoming is a randomized mapper that can be designed based on random projections (RP) [3] . Although the decorrelation property of orthogonal transforms is well-known [1] , the RP are based on approximately orthogonal bases. Therefore, the statistics of projected data, i.e., the covariance matrix, are not well justified. On the other hand, prior knowledge of the statistics of extracted digital fingerprints is crucial for evaluation of the performance of CBI systems. As mentioned above, the second important issue of CBI systems is their ability to deal with highly distorted data where the performance of unique decoding is characterized by a high probability of error. As a possible solution, one can envision the use of the Forney [4] list decoding approach as mentioned in [5] . However, in many identification problems, the final sink of information is a human being. This restriction makes this type of list decoding undesirable, due to a high variability of the list size, i.e., for a very noisy environment the list can be exceedingly long. Another solution, which is proposed by the authors in [6] , is the constrained Order Statistics List Decoding (OSLD) approach. In the constrained OSLD, which is indeed a combination of Elias [8] and Forney list decoding approaches in communication setups, a limited maximal number of candidates with the largest likelihood functions that can satisfy a specific threshold is selected. The performance analysis accomplished in [6] is based on the assumption that contents are generated independently and identically, which is not true for multimedia data [1] . Moreover, one is often interested in choosing system parameters, i.e., the length of digital fingerprints, the threshold and the maximum number of final candidates, to ensure that the probabilities of miss and false acceptance are below certain bounds. Hence, in this paper, we derive bounds on the probabilities of miss and false acceptance using fingerprints of a given length.
The main contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows: we introduce an identification setup by using a constrained OSLD for a class of multimedia data that can be modeled by a correlation-based model like the Gauss-Markov process, which captures image pixel dependencies directly in the coordinate domain [1] . Then, we analyze the fundamental performance limit by deriving bounds on the miss and false acceptance probabilities.
Notations: We use capital letters X to denote scalar random 
II. IDENTIFICATION SETUP
The identification setup under analysis shown in Fig. 1 consists of two main phases: content enrollment and content identification.
Regarding storage requirements and computational complexity, the cost of identification could be enormous for large databases, especially in multimedia applications. Therefore, in the content enrollment phase, the digital fingerprints are extracted from contents to be identified and stored in a Database. The database is a collection of M binary vectors denoted by
is a digital fingerprint extracted from the content x m , x m ∈ X N , which is drawn from a common stationary distribution p(x). Here φ(·) is a digital fingerprint extraction function that can be key-dependent.
In the content identification phase, for a given query y, the digital fingerprint is extracted following the same approach as in the enrollment phase, i.e., b y = φ(y). Then, the decoder that has the access to the enrolled Database constructs a list of indices of entries N l which are the most likely related to the query. Otherwise, it produces an erasure, N l = ∅. a) Identification Problem: In the event the query digital fingerprint b y is related to some element b xm of the database, one can assume that this relationship can be modeled by a binary channel with the transition probability p(b y |b xm ). If the query digital fingerprint b y is unrelated to any database entry, we assume that b y is drawn from
. Therefore, we can define the content identification problem as a composite hypothesis test:
where H 0 and H m correspond to the cases that the query digital fingerprint b y is unrelated, and the query digital fingerprint b y is related to the m th entry of database, respectively. b) Decoder: We define the constrained OSLD as follows:
all entries of the database are evaluated.
2) The N l indices with the largest likelihood functions are chosen which form a set N l . The parameter N l is referred to as the primary list size.
3) The final output set of the decoder is defined by N l = {m ∈ N l : p(b y |b xm ) ≥ e γL }, where the parameter γ controls the number of final candidates. The performance metrics of the identification setup are defined by the probability of miss,
and the probability of false acceptance:
III. DIGITAL FINGERPRINT EXTRACTION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The digital fingerprint extraction function φ(·) works as follows:
1) The dimensionality of some content x m or a query y is reduced from N to L by applying random projections (RP) [9] , which are approximately orthoprojectors, i.e., ww
For a given w, the projectedx m andỹ are obtained bỹ x m = wx m andỹ = wy. 2) L-length binary digital fingerprints, b y and b xm , are derived by taking the sign of the projected data, i.e.,
.
A. The Statistics of Content Digital Fingerprints
In this Section, we investigate the statistics of content digital fingerprints obtained by the RP. We assume that the content X is the Gauss-Markov process with the covariance matrix K xx . This is a simple but often-used model in image processing [1] . The covariance matrix of the projected data is obtained by:
where K xx is defined by [1] :
where σ 2 X and 0 ≤ ρ < 1 are the variance and the normalized correlation coefficient, respectively. We use the following proposition for statistical modeling of projected data. 
Pr max
where
Proof: Appendix A.
Remark 1. For a sufficiently large N and L, L ≤ N , α → 0 and β → 0, Kxx asymptotically converges to σ 2 X I L with high probability. Moreover, from the fact that the content source is the Gauss-Markov process, which implies that the content vector x is jointly Gaussian, and RP is a linear transform, the projected datax follows the jointly Gaussian distribution, i.e.,X ∼ N (0, Kxx). Therefore, since elements ofx are asymptotically uncorrelated, Kxx ≈ σ 2 X I L , one can conclude thatx are asymptotically independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and follows Bernoulli( The decorrelation property of the RP is illustrated in Fig. 2 . All off-diagonal elements of Kxx are below of the evaluated threshold β.
B. The Statistics of Query Digital Fingerprint
Consider the query y to be a noisy version of a content that can be modeled as the Gauss-Markov process and is observed through an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel, Y = X+Z, where Z ∼ N (0, σ 2 Z I N ) and σ 2 Z is the variance of the noise. At the output of the first step of the digital fingerprint extraction, we haveỸ =X +Z. From Proposition 1, we can asymptotically assume that the projected content part of the query,X, follows the distribution N (0, σ 2 X I L ). To justify the statistics ofZ, we have the following collary.
Corollary 1 (uncorrelatedness preservation property of RP).
Let the RP matrix, W, be generated the same as in Proposition 1, and Z are drawn i.i.d. from a common stationary distribution with variance σ 2 Z . Then, the diagonal elements of covariance matrix of the projected noiseZ = WZ are equal to σ 2 Z , i.e., ∀i, K iĩ zz = σ 2 Z , and all off-diagonal elements of Kzz satisfies: with crossover probability
IV. BOUNDS ON ERROR PROBABILITIES
In this section, we derive bounds on the miss and false acceptance probabilities based on the obtained results.
A. Miss Probability Bound
From Remark 3, conditioned on H m , the transition probability of the BSC is given by p(b y |b xm ) = P dm
that is a decreasing function of the Hamming distance
which is a realization of D m and can be considered as a sufficient statistic. From Remark 1, all entries of the database are i.i.d., and since they can be queried equally likely, i.e., Pr{H m } = 1 M , the overall probability of miss does not depend on the particular index and hence for m = 1, i.e., m 1 :
and (a) follows from the addition rule of probability . The first term in the above equation is referred to as the miss probability of the first kind, P I m , and the second term is the miss probability of the second kind, P II m . By using Remarks 1 and 3, conditioned on H 1 , the sufficient statistics mentioned above have the following distributions for
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Proposition 2 (Miss probability bound). For the binary symmetric channel with the crossover probability P b , the probability of miss of the constrained OSLD, for any η, P b < η < 1 2 , is bounded by:
Proof: Appendix C.
Remark 4. For the case N l = 1, i.e., Maximum Likelihood (ML) decoding, the obtained miss probability bound coincides with the result achieved in [2] . If N l > 1, i.e., list decoding, P I m converges to 0 faster than for the ML decoding. Remark 5. For P b < η < 1 2 and if R < ln 2 − H 2 (η) there exist fingerprints with the rate R and miss probability P m such that lim L→∞ P m = 0.
B. False Acceptance Probability Bound
From Remark 3 , conditioned on H 0 , the sufficient statistics
Proposition 3 (False acceptance probability bound). For the binary symmetric channel with the crossover probability P b , the average probability of false acceptance of the constrained OSLD, for any η, P b < η < 1 2 , is bounded by
Proof: Appendix D.
Remark 6. For P b < η < 1 2 and R < ln 2 − H 2 (η) there exist fingerprints with the rate R and false acceptance probability P f such that lim L→∞ P f = 0.
Remark 7. From Remarks 5, 6, both P m and P f go to zero as L goes to ∞. Moreover, it holds for η arbitrarily close to P b . Therefore, the identification capacity C id = I(B x , B y ) = ln 2 − H 2 (P b ) [10] is achievable.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a theoretical analysis of the proposed CBI system in multimedia applications. A quite simple approach is introduced to extract digital fingerprints from multimedia data that can be modeled by the GaussMarkov process.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: At first, we consider off-diagonal elements of Kxx that can be expanded as follows:
Due to symmetry of the covariance matrix, we investigate upper off-diagonal elements only, i.e., 1 ≤ i < j ≤ L. In order to bound these elements, we evaluate an upper bound for the probability that the largest upper off-diagonal elements of Kxx is greater than σ
ζ, where ζ is a positive real value. This probability is given by:
where (a) follows from the fact that there are only
follows form the generalized Chebyshev inequality [7] for s ≥ 0, (c) holds form (9), κ k = ρ
Then, we have:
where (a) holds due to the convexity of exp(·), (b) follows from the fact that E exp(sT ζ, the probability can be bounded by
For the diagonal elements of Kxx we have:
. Similar to (10), we evaluate an upper bound for the probability that the largest deviation of diagonal elements of Kxx from σ 
where λ k = ρ 
